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Abstract
We examine incentive-compatible mechanisms for fair ﬁnancing
and eﬃcient selection of a public budget (or public good). A mecha-
nism selects the level of the public budget and imposes taxes on indi-
viduals. Individuals’ preferences are quasilinear. Fairness is expressed
as weak monotonicity (called scale monotonicity) of the tax imposed
on an individual as a function of his beneﬁt from an increased level
of the public budget. Eﬃciency is expressed as selection of a Pareto-
optimal level of the public budget. The budget deﬁcit is the diﬀerence
between the public budget and the total amount of taxes collected
from the individuals.
We show that any eﬃcient scale-monotonic and incentive-compatible
mechanism may generate a budget deﬁcit. Moreover, it is impossible
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1to collect taxes that always cover a ﬁxed small fraction of the total
cost.
1 Introduction
The Pareto-optimal social states depend on individuals’ preferences, which
are private information. Therefore, a collective choice that aims at select-
ing Pareto-optimal alternatives requires input from the individuals, and the
input of the individuals should convey suﬃcient information regarding their
preferences. For instance, if the input of each individual is his own preference
over the alternatives, a collective choice mechanism can select an outcome
that is Pareto optimal with respect to the reported preferences. However,
a mechanism that selects the social state as a function of the individuals’
input (e.g., the individuals’ preferences) may be subject to manipulation.
The individuals’ selﬁsh incentives may lead to input that does not convey
suﬃcient information for the selection of an optimal outcome with respect to
the individuals’ true preferences. A common exception to this dilemma is a
dictatorial collective choice that selects an alternative that is most preferred
by the dictator.
In the most general setup, the result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterth-
waite (1975) precluded the possibility of ﬁnding a non-dictatorial determin-
istic mechanism for choosing social states in which individuals do not have
the possibility of manipulating the mechanism to their own advantage. In
the more specialized context of quasilinear preferences, Groves (1973), Clarke
2(1971), and Vickrey (1961) found a class of mechanisms, called VCG mech-
anisms, in which stating one’s true preferences is a dominant strategy and a
Pareto optimum is selected, i.e., a class of strategy-proof and eﬃcient direct
mechanisms.
We recall the classical model to which the VCG mechanisms applies. The
model consists of a society of n individuals and a set S of public alternatives.
A public alternative s is a vector (k,t1,...,tn), where k is an element of a set
K of public projects, and ti is a real number representing the monetary trans-
fer from individual i. Individual i’s preferences are described by a function
ui : S → R that is of the form ui(k,t1,...,tn) = vi(k) − ti, where vi, called
agent i’s valuation functions, is the private information of agent i. If the cost
of project k is c(k) then the budget deﬁcit of the alternative (k,t1,...,tn) is
c(k) −
P
i ti, and the project k is eﬃcient with respect to v1,...,vn if and
only if
P
i vi(k) − c(k) ≥
P
i vi(k0) − c(k0) for all k0 ∈ K.
A VCG mechanism maps a list of valuation functions v = (v1,...,vn)
to the outcome s(v) = (k∗,t1(v),...,tn(v)) where k∗ = k(v) is eﬃcient with







where v−i is the vector of valuations with the i-th coordinate vi omitted.
The VCG mechanisms are truthfully implementable in dominant strate-
gies and select an eﬃcient outcome. Green and Laﬀont (1977, 1979) and
Holmstrom (1979) provide sets of conditions under which these are the only
social choice functions that are truthfully implementable in dominant strate-
3gies and select an eﬃcient outcome. Holmstrom’s conditions hold in our
model and therefore we focus in the Introduction on VCG mechanisms.
Another desirable property of a mechanism is balancing the budget, namely,
P
i ti(v) = c(k(v)). Unfortunately, in many cases it is impossible. Green and
Laﬀont (1979) show that when every valuation function is possible, then
there is no VCG mechanism that balances the budget.
However, there are VCG mechanisms that do not generate a deﬁcit, for
example, when there are ﬁnitely many projects. Another example is when the
cost of all projects is bounded from below by a constant B, and the valuation
functions are bounded from above by a constant C, in which case the VCG
mechanisms with ci(v−i) = (n − 1)C − B(n − 1)/n cover the cost of the
selected public project. More generally, if there is a constant D (the previous
example corresponds to D = B − nC) such that c(k) −
Pn
j=1 vj(k) ≥ D for
all projects k and all valuation functions v1,...,vn, the VCG mechanisms
with ci(v−i) = −D(n − 1)/n cover the cost of the selected public project.
In Section 7.4 we show that also in the model where K = R+, c(k) = k,
and Vi consists of all nondecreasing concave functions v (normalized with
v(0) = 0 and with v0(x) → 0 as x → ∞), there are VCG mechanisms that
never generate a deﬁcit. Note that in our model a valuation function need not
be bounded. Even if we consider only bounded valuation functions, there is
no single constant that bounds all valuation functions. Thus, even for a ﬁxed
k, the terms c(k) −
Pn
j=1 vj(k) are not bounded from below when v1,...,vn
ranges over all valuation functions.
One possible interpretation of our model is that a point in K = R+
4stands for the society’s total budget. Once the budget is speciﬁed, a known
mechanism or bargaining allocates (either deterministically or stochastically)
the budget to public projects. Thus, an individual preference over the ﬁnal
bundle of projects transforms into a preference over the budget, represented
by a valuation function v : R+ → R, with the normalization v(0) = 0. An
alternative interpretation is that K = R+ stands for the possible levels of a
public good, rescaled so that the cost of level x is x. In both interpretations,
ti stands for the tax imposed on individual i. We assume that the valuation
functions v are nondecreasing concave functions with v0(x) → 0 (where v0(x)
stands for the right-hand derivative of v at x) as x → ∞.
A natural desirable fairness property of the taxation is monotonicity: if
individual i’s beneﬁt from any increment in the public budget is never less
than that of individual j, i.e., v0
i(x) ≥ v0
j(x) for all x ≥ 0, then ti(v) ≥ tj(v).
Theorem 1 introduces a symmetric and monotonic VCG mechanism ϕ¯ x
(that depends on the parameter ¯ x) that never runs a deﬁcit on the restricted
domain V ¯ x of all valuation functions v with v0(x) ≤ 1/n for every x ≥ ¯ x.
Theorem 2 asserts that there is no VCG mechanism that is monotonic
and never runs a budget deﬁcit. Moreover, we prove a stronger result by
weakening the monotonicity requirement and allowing for some deﬁcit. We
formulate a much weaker fairness property, called scale monotonicity of a
mechanism: if all valuation functions are multiples αiw of a ﬁxed valuation
function w, then ti(α1w,...,αnw) ≥ tj(α1w,...,αnw) whenever αi ≥ αj.
Theorem 3 asserts that for any scale-monotonic VCG mechanism and every
γ > 0 there is a valuation vector v for which the taxes do not cover even
5the γ fraction of the budget, and moreover such a budget deﬁcit can arise
for a valuation vector v = (w,w,...,w) with identical valuations for all
individuals.
2 The Model
Let W be the set of all concave functions w : R+ → R, with w(0) = 0
and limx→∞ w0(x) = 0, where for a nondiﬀerentiable (concave) w we denote
by w0(x) the right-hand derivative, i.e., the limit lim0<ε→0
w(x+ε)−w(x)
ε . An
element w ∈ W is called a valuation function. The model hN,V1,...,Vni
consists of a set of individuals, N = {1,...,n}, and a family of valuation
functions, V1,...,Vn ⊂ W. If V1 = V2 = ... = Vn = V ⊂ W we denote by
hN,V i the model hN,V1,...,Vni.
The interpretation is as follows. The set N is the set of individuals. The
set Vi is the set of player i’s possible valuation functions of a level/quantity
of the public budget/good. Each individual has a valuation function vi ∈ Vi.
The n-member society chooses x ∈ R+, interpreted as the level/quantity of
the public budget/good, and assigns taxes to each individual in the amount
of ti. The resulting outcome is then expressed as a vector (x,t1,...,tn) in
R+ ×Rn. Thus the set of outcomes associated with this public budget/good
model is
Ω = {(x,t1,...,tn) | x ∈ R+,ti ∈ R}.
The preference of individual i over the set of outcomes is given by a utility
6function
ui(x,t1,...,tn) = vi(x) − ti
where vi ∈ Vi. The valuation function vi of individual i is private information.
A social choice mechanism for such a public goods economy is an N-
person game form (N;(Si)i∈N;ϕ) where
ϕ = (ϕ0,ϕ1,...,ϕn) : ×i∈NSi → Ω.
I.e., a mechanism is a collection of n strategy sets S1,...,Sn and an outcome
function ϕ : S1 × ... × Sn → Ω. It can be viewed as a procedure for making
the collective choice. The feasible actions of individual i are summarized by
his strategy set Si, and the rule for how agents’ actions specify the collective
choice is given by the outcome function ϕ. The selected level/quantity of
the public budget/good, as a function of the proﬁle of actions/strategies
(s1,...,sn), is given by ϕ0(s1,...,sn), and the tax imposed on individual i is
given by ϕi(s1,...,sn). A mechanism is called a direct revelation mechanism
if for every individual i in N, Si = V .
The interpretation of the ﬁrst coordinate x of a point in the outcome space
Ω is the level of the public budget (or the expenditure on the public good,
or the level/quantity of the public good when we assume unit cost). Thus,
the budget deﬁcit associated with the outcome (x,t1,...,tn) is x −
P
i∈N ti.
A VCG mechanism is a direct revelation mechanism where for a vector
of valuation functions v = (v1,...,vn) we have
n X
i=1
vi(ϕ0(v)) − ϕ0(v) ≥
n X
i=1
vi(x) − x for all x ≥ 0
7and




where v−i is the vector of valuation v without its i-th coordinate vi.
3 Desirable Properties of a Mechanism
In this section we introduce a list of properties that are used in the statements
of our results.
3.1 Eﬃciency
An outcome (x,t1,...,tn) is called eﬃcient with respect to a list of valuations
v = v1,...,vn with vi ∈ V , if there is no other outcome (y,s1,...,sn) such
that for every i ∈ N









The ﬁrst list of inequalities implies that all individuals prefer the outcome
(y,s1,...,sn) to the outcome (x,t1,...,tn) and the second one guarantees
further that the budget deﬁcit of the outcome (x,t1,...,tn) is greater than
the budget deﬁcit of the outcome (y,s1,...,sn).
The next (straightforward) result characterizes the eﬃcient outcomes.







Proof. If y ≥ 0 with
Pn
i=1 vi(y) − y >
Pn
i=1 vi(x) − x, for suﬃciently small
ε > 0 and si = ti + vi(y) − vi(x) − ε, we have vi(y) − si > vi(x) − ti and
y −
Pn
i=1 si < x −
Pn
i=1 ti and therefore (x,t1,...,tn) is not eﬃcient. On
the other hand, assume that (x,t1,...,tn) is an outcome such that for every
y ≥ 0,
Pn
i=1 vi(y) − y ≤
Pn
i=1 vi(x) − x. If (y,s1,...,sn) is an outcome with
y −
Pn











and therefore there is an individual i with vi(y) − si < vi(x) − ti. Therefore
(x,t1,...,tn) is eﬃcient.
The result illustrates that the eﬃciency of an outcome (x,t1,...,tn) de-
pends on its ﬁrst coordinate only. Note that the proof does not use the
concavity of the valuation functions v ∈ W. Therefore, the proposition holds
also when the set of valuation functions W is replaced by the set U of all
functions v : R+ → R. If v1,...,vn ∈ U are concave and diﬀerentiable then




(and (0,t1,...,tn) is eﬃcient if and only if
Pn
i=1 v0
i(0) ≤ 1). If v1,...,vn ∈ U
are continuous and vi(x) = o(x) as x → ∞ (which holds in particular when
vi is diﬀerentiable and v0
i(x) →x→∞ 0 or vi(x + 1) − vi(x) →x→∞ 0) then an
eﬃcient outcome exists.
A mechanism is eﬃcient if it is a direct revelation mechanism such that
for every list of valuations v = v1,...,vn with vi ∈ V , ϕ(v) is an eﬃcient






In that case we also say that ϕ is eﬃcient with respect to V .
3.2 Incentive Compatibility
An incentive-compatible mechanism is a direct mechanism in which stating
one’s true preference is a dominant strategy. It follows from [8, Theorem 2]
that the VCG mechanisms are the only eﬃcient incentive-compatible mech-
anisms whenever the domains of valuation functions V1,...,Vn (⊂ W of
i = 1,...,n respectively) are convex.
3.3 Feasibility (Budget Balance)
A mechanism is feasible (fully funded) if for every list of valuation functions




A mechanism balances the budget if for every list of valuation functions v




A mechanism is γ-funded, γ > 0, if for every list of valuation functions v




10It is quite common to observe societies/countries whose budget is not bal-
anced. Many such societies run a budget deﬁcit. However, it is quite common
to observe a budget deﬁcit that is a small fraction of the budget. The concept
of γ-fundedness enables us to quantify the maximal deﬁcit as a fraction of the
budget. For example a .95-funded mechanism translates to never running a
budget deﬁcit of more that 5% of the public expenditure.
3.4 Monotonicity
In this subsection we deﬁne various concepts of monotonicity that capture
diﬀerent equitable constraints by way of the distribution of the total tax
among the individuals.
A mechanism is monotonic (w.r.t. V ) if for every two individuals i,j ∈ N,
v1,...,vn ∈ V , with vi(b) − vi(a) ≥ vj(b) − vj(a) for all b > a,
ϕi(v1,...,vn) ≥ ϕj(v1,...,vn).
The above monotonicity requires that whenever we are faced with valuation
functions in which the marginal beneﬁts to individual i from an increased
level/quantity of the public budget/good are no less than those to individual
j, the taxes levied on individual i be at least as much as those levied on
individual j.
The next monotonicity property requires the above monotonicity of taxes
only in cases where all valuations are a multiple of one ﬁxed valuation func-
tion.
11A mechanism is scale-monotonic (w.r.t. V ) if for every two individuals
i,j ∈ N, w ∈ V , positive numbers αk, k = 1,...,n, with αkw ∈ V and
αi > αj,
ϕi(α1w,...,αnw) ≥ ϕj(α1w,...,αnw).
We introduce the following notation: given α = (α1,...,αn) ∈ Rn
+ and
w ∈ W, α ∗ w denotes the list α1w,...,αnw of valuation functions.
A mechanism is strongly scale-monotonic (w.r.t. V ) if for every two indi-
viduals i,j ∈ N, w ∈ V , positive numbers αk, k = 1,...,n, with αi > αj,
ϕi(α ∗ w) − αiw(ϕ0(α ∗ w)) ≥ ϕj(α ∗ w) − αjw(ϕ0(α ∗ w)).
The concept of a strongly scale-monotonic mechanism is related to progres-
sive taxation. As αiw(ϕ0(α ∗ w)) represents the utility of individual i from
the level/quantity ϕ0(α∗w) of the public budget/good speciﬁed by the mech-
anism ϕ, the diﬀerence ϕi(α ∗ w) − αiw(ϕ0(α ∗ w) represents individual i’s
net taxation. A mechanism ϕ is strongly scale-monotonic if whenever all
individuals possess a valuation function that is a multiple of a ﬁxed valua-
tion function w, those with higher valuation and thus also higher marginal
valuation have larger net taxation.
3.5 Symmetry
The symmetric property deﬁned below is a desirable requirement for an eq-
uitable mechanism. It is not, however, an assumption in our impossibility
theorems. Nevertheless, in order to show that the assumptions of the theo-
12rems below are tight, we wish to demonstrate that each condition is necessary,
even if we consider only symmetric mechanisms.
A social choice mechanism ϕ : ×i∈NSi → Ω is called symmetric if Si = Sj
for every i,j ∈ N and for every (σ1,...,σn) ∈ ×i∈NSi and every permutation




4 Monotonic VCG Mechanisms with No Deﬁcit
In this section we demonstrate the existence of monotonic and symmetric
VCG mechanisms that never generate a deﬁcit on some domain of the val-
uation function. For example, let K be a suﬃciently large constant, and
let V (K) be the set of all valuations v ∈ W s.t. v(x) ≤ K + x/n. It
follows that for every list of valuations v1,...,vn we have
Pn
i=1 vi(x) ≤
x+nK. Then the VCG mechanism ϕ with ϕi(v1,...,vn) = ϕ0(v1,...,vn)−
P
j6=i vj(ϕ0(v1,...,vn))+(n−1)K is eﬃcient, feasible (as
Pn
i=1 ϕi(v1,...,vn) ≥
ϕ0(v1,...,vn)), monotonic and strongly scale-monotonic (moreover, vi ≥ vj,
which follows from v0
i ≥ v0
j and vi(0) = vj(0), implies ϕi(v1,...,vn) ≥
ϕj(v1,...,vn) and moreover ϕi(v1,...,vn)−vi(ϕ0(v1,...,vn)) ≥ ϕj(v1,...,vn)−
13vj(ϕ0(v1,...,vn)); this last inequality is in fact an equality), and strategy-
proof. Other, more interesting examples follow.
Consider the following special class of valuation functions. Let the valu-
ation function w : R+ → R+ be deﬁned by w(x) = x if x ≤ 1 and w(x) = 1
if x ≥ 1, and set V = Vw. One interpretation is as follows. There are two
public projects. The status quo project k0 needs no further budget and thus
the cost of k0 is 0, and a transition (improvement or replacement) to another
project k1 costs one unit of money. For a cost of 0 < x < 1 one can obtain an
external contractor to build project k1 with probability x, or alternatively, a
budget 0 < x < 1 can be placed in a risky asset yielding 1 (and thus covering
the cost of project k1) with probability x and yielding 0 with probability
1 − x. A valuation function αw of an individual represents a valuation of α
to the replacement of the status quo k0 with the project k1.











i αi > 1
0 if
P
i αi < 1
where x∗(α1,...,αn) is on
P
i αi = 1 a function of (α1,...,αn) with 0 ≤







14The question arises whether one can select the functions ci so that the
corresponding VCG mechanism is feasible and monotonic. The answer is yes.
In fact, we prove a more general result.
Let ¯ x > 0 and let V ¯ x stand for all valuation functions v ∈ W with
v0(x) ≤ 1/n for x > ¯ x. It follows that for every list of valuation functions
v : v1,...,vn with vi ∈ V ¯ x there is an eﬃcient budget x∗ ≤ ¯ x.
Theorem 1 Assume that Vi = V ¯ x. There is a symmetric, monotonic, and
strongly scale-monotonic VCG mechanism that never runs a budget deﬁcit
for a list of valuation functions with vi ∈ V ¯ x.
Proof. Consider the following VCG mechanism where






(equivalently, ϕ0(v) is the minimal eﬃcient budget) and






vj(ϕ0(v−i)) − ϕ0(v−i) + ¯ x/n
where v−i is the list of valuation functions v with its i-th coordinate vi re-
placed by the constant function 0. Obviously, ϕ is symmetric.
Let v = v1,...,vn and assume that vi ∈ V ¯ x. We ﬁrst demonstrate
that
Pn




j6=i vj(ϕ0(v−i)) ≤ x − ϕ0(v−i). Therefore, setting x = ϕ0(v) we have
ϕi(v) ≥ ¯ x/n, and thus
P
i ϕi(v) ≥ ¯ x ≥ ϕ0(v).
Next we demonstrate monotonicity. By the symmetry of ϕ it suﬃces to
prove that ϕ1(v) ≥ ϕ2(v) whenever v0
1(x) ≥ v0
2(x) for every x. Assume that
15v0
1(x) ≥ v0
2(x) for every x. Set x = ϕ0(v), x1 = ϕ0(v−1), and x2 = ϕ0(v−2).

























x2 − x1. Therefore,


































vj(x2) − x2 + x1 − x1 + ¯ x/n
= ϕ2(v)
5 The Impossibility Results
The main result asserts that it is impossible to ﬁnd an eﬃcient, scale-monotonic,
and strategy-proof mechanism for hN,Wi that always collects taxes that
cover at least a ﬁxed fraction of the cost:
16Theorem 2 Assume that the society N = {1,...,n} has at least two mem-
bers. For every eﬃcient, scale-monotonic, and strategy-proof mechanism ϕ
on hN,Wi and every γ > 0, there exists a list of valuation functions v1,...,vn




We will actually state and prove a stronger result. Note that if V ⊂ W,
the restriction of any eﬃcient, scale-monotonic, and strategy-proof mecha-
nism for hN,Wi to hN,V i is an eﬃcient, scale-monotonic, and strategy-proof
mechanism for hN,V i. Given w ∈ W we denote by Vw the set of valuation
functions {aw | a ≥ 0}. The next theorem asserts the existence of a diﬀeren-
tiable and strictly concave valuation function w ∈ W s.t. for every n > 1 and
every eﬃcient, scale-monotonic, and strategy-proof mechanism ϕ on hN,Vwi
(where N = {1,...,n}) and every γ > 0, there exists a list of valuation




Theorem 3 There exists a smooth strictly concave function w ∈ W such
that for every society N with at least two members, every positive constant
γ, and every eﬃcient, strategy-proof, and scale-monotonic mechanism ϕ on




17In Section 7.5 we demonstrate a smooth strictly concave function w ∈
W, w(x) =
√
x, and a symmetric, eﬃcient, feasible, scale-monotonic, and
strategy-proof mechanism for hN,Vwi. However, by replacing scale mono-
tonicity by strong scale monotonicity in Theorem 2, we obtain an impossi-
bility result for hN,Vwi, where w ∈ W is any valuation function:
Theorem 4 Assume n ≥ 2 and w ∈ W. Then there is no eﬃcient, strategy-
proof, feasible, and strongly scale-monotonic mechanism for hN,Vwi.
6 Proofs
Assume that w ∈ W. Let Vw be the set of all valuation functions v ∈ W of
the form v = αw. Deﬁne the map ψ : Rn
+ → R+ × Rn by
ψ(α1,...,αn) = ϕ(α1w,...,αnw).
Given α = (α1,...,αn) ∈ Rn
+, we denote by α−i the n − 1 dimensional
vector (α1,...,αi−1,αi+1,...,αn). The ﬁrst lemma states a property of a list
of functions ψi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) that corresponds to an eﬃcient and strategy-
proof mechanism ϕ for hN,Vwi. The domain Vw is convex and therefore, as
mentioned earlier, by applying [8, Theorem 2] to the restricted domain Vw
we have
Lemma 1 Assume that ϕ is an eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism. Then




where ci is an arbitrary function.
18Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that ϕ is an eﬃcient, feasible, strategy-proof,
and strongly scale-monotonic mechanism for hN,Vwi. Set ψ(α1,...,αn) =
ϕ(α1w,...,αnw).
As ϕ is feasible,
Pn




















αj(w ◦ ψ0)(α) − ψ0(α)
#
− ci(α−i)
= (n − 1)q(α) − ci(α−i)
where q is the function deﬁned by q(α) =
Pn
j=1 αj(w ◦ ψ0)(α) − ψ0(α).
We next prove that q(α) → ∞ as αi → ∞. We ﬁrst provide a proof in
the case that ψ0 and w are diﬀerentiable. Diﬀerentiating the function q with
respect to αi we obtain
∂q
∂αi













j=1 αjw0(ψ0(α)) = 1 by the eﬃciency of ϕ,
∂q
∂αi
(α) = (w ◦ ψ0)(α).
Therefore,
∂q
∂αi(α) is positive and nondecreasing in αi, implying that q(α) →
∞ as αi → ∞. We now prove that q(α) → ∞ as αi → ∞ without the
diﬀerentiability assumption on ψ0.
Fix x0 > 0 with w0(x0) > 0 and thus w(x0) > 0. In the remainder of
the present proof w0(x) stands for the left-hand derivative w at x. By the
19concavity of w, w0(x) ≤
w(x)−w(x0)
x−x0 for every x > x0, and
w(x)−w(x0)
x−x0 > 0 for












The assumptions on w – concavity and w0(y) →y→∞ 0 – imply that
w(x)−w(x0)
x−x0 →







− x0 →x→∞ ∞.
Assume ψ0(α) > 0, which holds for suﬃciently large αi. As
Pn
j=1 αjw0(ψ0(α))





either there is x with w0(x) = 0 and then ψ0(α) is bounded, or ψ0(α) →αi→∞
∞ and then q(α) ≥
w(ψ0(α))
w0(ψ0(α)) − ψ0(α). In either case, q(α) → ∞ as αi → ∞.
As ci(α−i) is independent of αi and given αj, j 6= i, q(α) → ∞ as
αi → ∞, the inequality
P
j6=i cj(α−j) ≥ (n − 1)q(α) − ci(α−i) implies that
P
j6=i cj(α−j) → ∞ as αi → ∞. Therefore, for any given αj, j 6= i, there
exists a suﬃciently large number αi, such that
P
j6=i cj(α−j) > (n−1)ci(α−i)
and for every j 6= i αi > αj. In particular, it implies that there is j 6= i
with αj < αi and cj(α−j) > ci(α−i). As (ψi(α) − αiw(ψ0(α)) − (ψj(α) −
αjw(ψ0(α)) = ci(α−i) − cj(α−j), we deduce that ϕ is not strongly scale-
monotonic.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let w be smooth and strictly concave. Assume
that ϕ is an eﬃcient, scale-monotonic, and strategy-proof mechanism on
hN,Vwi. For (α1,...,αn) ∈ Rn we set ψ(α1,...,αn) := ϕ(α1w,...,αnw) and
c(w) =
Pn
i=1 ψi(0,...,0). Note that the mechanism ϕ is deﬁned on hN,Vwi
20and thus c(w) depends on the domain Vw of ϕ and thus it depends indirectly
on w. For every β > 0 let x(β) be the unique point with βw0(x(β)) = 1. For




The following lemma bounds from above the total taxes
P
i∈N ψi(α,...,α)
by a sum of three terms: the ﬁrst term c(w) which depends on w but does not
depend on α, the second term θ = θ(w,α,n) := nα
Pn−1
s=1 w(xs(α)) ≤ n(n −
1)w(xn−1(α)) which is bounded from above by a function of the the restric-
tion of w to the interval [0,xn−1(α)], and the last term d = d(w,n,α) is given
by d(w,n,α) := nxn(α) − n(n − 1)αw(xn(α)). As (n − 1)αw0(xn−1(α)) = 1,







Lemma 2 For every α ∈ R+
X
i∈N














i∈N ψi(0,...,0) and θ = nα
Pn−1
s=1 w(xs(α)).
Proof. Given a subset S ⊂ N we deﬁne the vectors e(S) ∈ Rn by ei(S) = 1
if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. For i ∈ N and S ⊂ N we denote by e−i(S) the
vector (e(S))−i, i.e., the vector obtained by eliminating the i-th coordinate of
e(S). Using scale monotonicity, ψi(αe(S)) − ψj(αe(S)) ≥ 0 whenever i ∈ S,
j 6∈ S, and α ∈ R+. Assume that i ∈ S and j 6∈ S. Then,
ψi(αe(S)) = ψ0(αe(S)) − (|S| − 1)αw(ψ0(αe(S))) + ci(αe−i(S)) (1)
21and
ψj(αe(S)) = ψ0(αe(S)) − |S|αw(ψ0(αe(S))) + cj(αe−j(S)).
Therefore, the inequality ψi(αe(S)) − ψj(αe(S)) ≥ 0 implies that
cj(αe−j(S)) ≤ ci(αe−i(S)) + αw(ψ0(αe(S))). (2)
For each ﬁxed integer s = 1,...,n − 1, the average of cj(αe−j(S)) over
all pairs j 6∈ S with |S| = s is denoted c−(s). Similarly, the average of
ci(αe−i(S)) over all pairs i ∈ S with |S| = s is denoted c+(s). Note that as
w is strictly concave, ψ0(αe(S)) depends only on the cardinality of S and α,
and xs(α) = ψ0(αe(S)), the unique point x with sαw0(x) = 1.
Averaging the inequalities (2) over all triples i,j,S with |S| = s, i ∈ S
and j 6= S we obtain
c−(s) ≤ c
+(s) + αw(xs(α)).





thus by summing the above inequalities over s = 1,...,n − 1,





By the deﬁnition of the functions c− and c+,
P
i∈N ci(αe−i(N)) = nc+(n) =




ψi(αe(N)) = nxn(α) − n(n − 1)αw(xn(α)) + nc−(n − 1).







w(xs(α)) + nxn(α) − n(n − 1)αw(xn(α)).
(4)
Note that nc+(1) depends on the domain Vw of ϕ, and thus is a function
of n and w. The second summand on the right-hand side of the inequality,
nα
Pn−1
s=1 w(xs(α)), (equals θ by deﬁnition and) is ≤ n(n − 1)w(xn−1(α)) by
the monotonicity of w and s 7→ xs(α). Recall that (n − 1)αw0(xn−1(α)) = 1
and thus (n − 1)αw(xn(α)) =
w(xn(α))
w0(x(n−1,α)). This completes the proof of the
lemma.
Let (nk)∞
k=1 be a sequence of positive integers with nk > 1, 0 < α(k) ↑ ∞
with nkα(k) < α(k + 1), and 0 < γk →k→∞ 0.
Lemma 3 There exists a strictly concave valuation function w in W and
sequences (xk)∞
k=0 and (zk)∞
k=1 with x0 = 0 and
(nk − 1)α(k)w
0(zk) = 1 and nkα(k)w
0(xk) = 1 ∀k ≥ 1 (5)
s.t. for every k ≥ 1 we have
nk(nk − 1)w(zk) + nkzk ≤ γkxk (6)
and
w(xk) = (xk − zk)w
0(zk) (7)
(and thus zk < xk < zk+1).
Proof. We deﬁne inductively increasing sequences (xk)k≥0 and (zk)k≥1
with zk = xk−1 + nk − 1 < xk, and smooth and strictly concave functions
23wk : [0,xk] → R+ and vk : [0,zk] → R+ so that: v1(0) = 0, wk coincides
with vk on [0,zk], vk+1 coincides with wk on [0,xk], nkα(k)w0
k(xk) = 1, and
jα(k)w0
k(xk−1 + j) = 1 (for 1 ≤ j ≤ nk − 1).
Set x0 = 0 and zk = xk−1+nk−1. Let v1 be a smooth and strictly concave
function deﬁned on [0,z1] so that jα(1)v0
1(j) = 1 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n1 − 1.
Assume that wk is a smooth and strictly concave function deﬁned on the
interval [0,xk] with wk(0) = 0 and w0(xk) = 1
nkα(k). As α(k + 1) > nkα(k)
we can extend the function wk to a smooth and strictly concave function
vk+1 deﬁned on the interval [0,zk+1] so that v0
k+1(xk + s) = 1
sα(k+1) for every
1 ≤ s < nk+1.
Assume that vk is a smooth and strictly concave function deﬁned on [0,zk]
with (nk − 1)α(k)v0
k(zk) = 1. Let xk be suﬃciently large so that γkxk >
nk(nk −1)w(zk)+nkzk and (xk −zk)w0










there exists a smooth and strictly concave function wk deﬁned on [0,xk] so




The sequence xk is increasing and the restriction of the smooth and
strictly concave function wk, which is deﬁned on [0,xk], to the interval
[0,xk−1] coincides with wk−1. Therefore there is a smooth and strictly con-
cave function w : R+ → R+ that extends all functions wk. This function w
obeys condition (5).
Let (nk)k be a sequence so that for every n there are inﬁnitely many
values of k so that nk = n, 0 < α(k) ↑ ∞ with nkα(k) < α(k + 1), and
240 < γk ↓ 0. Let w ∈ W satisfy conditions (5), (6), and (7). Fix a society N
with n members (N = {1,...,n}), and let ϕ be an eﬃcient, strategy-proof,
and scale-monotonic direct mechanism on hN,Vwi and Ψ : Rn
+ → R+ × Rn
the associated function.
Fix γ > 0. Let k be suﬃciently large so that nk = n, 2γk < γ, and γkxk >
c(w). By Lemma 2 we have
Pn
i=1 Ψi(α(k)e(N)) ≤ c(w) + n(n − 1)w(zk) +
n(xk−w(xk)/w0(zk)). Using equation (7) we have n(xk−w(xk)/w0(zk) = nzk
and therefore by using condition (6) we have
Pn
i=1 Ψi(α(k)e(N)) ≤ c(w) +
γkxk ≤ 2γkΨ0(α(k)e(N) ≤ γΨ0(α(k)e(N)). This completes the proof of
Theorem 2.
7 Tightness of the Assumptions
In this section we demonstrate that the conclusions of the theorems break
down whenever we weaken our assumptions.
7.1 Eﬃciency
The mechanism that sets ϕi(v) = 0 for every 0 ≤ i is strategy-proof, tax-
monotonic, and balances the budget.
257.2 Strategy-Proofness







is an eﬃcient tax-monotonic mechanism that balances the budget.
7.3 Feasibility
The classical Clarke–Groves mechanism that chooses an eﬃcient outcome
ϕ0(v) and




is symmetric, strongly scale-monotonic, strategy-proof, and eﬃcient.
7.4 Scale Monotonicity
The eﬃcient mechanism that selects






where vk stands for the vector of valuation functions (vk,...,vk) of length
n, is strategy-proof but is not scale-monotonic. We now prove that it is also
feasible, i.e., that
Pn
i=1 ϕi(v) ≥ ϕ0(v). We distinguish two cases: n ≥ 3 and
n = 2.
26First assume that n ≥ 3. Then
n X
i=1









≥ nϕ0(v) − (n − 1)
n X
i=1
vi(ϕ0(v)) + 2n(n − 2)max
j,k
vj(ϕ0(vk))
≥ nϕ0(v) − (n − 1)
n X
i=1




≥ nϕ0(v) ≥ ϕ0(v).
The second inequality uses the fact that for all but two possible values of
i, maxj,k6=i vj(ϕ0(vk)) ≥ maxj,k vj(ϕ0(vk)); the third inequality uses the in-
equality maxj,k vj(ϕ0(vk)) ≥ vi(ϕ0(v)) which follows from the monotonicity
of each vi together with the inequality maxk ϕ0(vk) ≥ ϕ0(v); the fourth
inequality follows from 2(n − 2) ≥ n − 1 whenever n ≥ 3.
Assume now that n = 2. In this case
ϕ1(v) = ϕ0(v) − v2(ϕ0(v) + 4v2(ϕ0(v2,v2))
ϕ2(v) = ϕ0(v) − v1(ϕ0(v) + 4v1(ϕ0(v1,v1)).





2(ϕ0(v)). Thus ϕ0(v1,v1) ≥ ϕ0(v), implying
that 2v1(ϕ0(v1,v1)) ≥ 2v1(ϕ0(v)) ≥ v1(ϕ0(v)) + v2(ϕ0(v)) and thus ϕ1(v)) +




2(ϕ0(v)). Thus, ϕ0(v1,v1) < ϕ0(v) < ϕ0(v2,v2).
27Together with the monotonicity of v2 this implies that
v2(ϕ0(v2,v2)) ≥ v2(ϕ0(v)). (8)




v2(ϕ0(v)) − v2(ϕ0(v1,v1)) > v1(ϕ0(v)) − v1(ϕ0(v1,v1)).
I.e., by rearranging the terms,
v1(ϕ0(v1,v1)) > v1(ϕ0(v)) − v2(ϕ0(v)) + v2(ϕ0(v1,v1)). (9)
Summing inequalities (8) and (9), we deduce that
v1(ϕ0(v1,v1)) + v2(ϕ0(v2,v2)) > v1(ϕ0(v)),
which, together with the assumption v1(ϕ0(v)) ≥ v2(ϕ0(v)), implies that
ϕ1(v) + ϕ2(v) ≥ 2ϕ0(v).
7.5 Strong Scale Monotonicity
Theorem 3 shows that there is no eﬃcient, feasible, and strategy-proof direct
mechanism that is strongly scale-monotonic. We next show that it is impos-
sible here to replace strong scale monotonicity with the weaker property of
scale monotonicity.
We ﬁrst illustrate an example with two members in the society, i.e., N =
{1,2}, and V = {aw | a > 0,w(x) =
√
x}. Simple calculations show that ϕ






ψi(α) = ψ0(α) − αj(w ◦ ψ0)(α) + α
2
j/2,
where j 6= i. Then ϕ is strategy-proof. In addition, this mechanism is











4 = ψ0(α), and thus ϕ is feasible.
Next we consider the n-member society, i.e., N = {1,...,n}, and V =
{aw | a > 0,w(x) =
√













































ψi(α) = ψ0(α) −
X
j6=i
αj(w ◦ ψ0)(α) + fi(α).

























k=1 xk, we deduce that ψi(α)−ψj(α) = 0, which
proves in particular that ψi(α) ≥ ψj(α) whenever αi ≥ αj, thus ϕ is scale-
monotonic. In addition, one can verify that ϕ is feasible. Indeed,
n X
i=1
ψi(α) − ψ0(α) = (n − 1)[ψ0(α) −
n X
k=1
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